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INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the early twentieth century, when the emergence of 
the automobile saved cities from being buried under the manure 
produced by their horse-based transportation system, technologies 
have emerged to help solve the unique problems faced by rapidly 
growing cities.1  Yet, as with the automobile, no matter how rapid and 
seemingly miraculous a technological solution, it will create its own 
set of problems that need to be addressed.  For a little over a decade, 
smart city technology has been promising to cure a wide variety of 
cities’ transportation, financial, environmental, and social ills.2  But 
unresolved concerns about smart city technology, especially relating 
to privacy, are increasingly delaying the development and 
implementation of these technologies in democracies. 
To explore the themes and issues outlined above, this Article takes 
a comparative approach to the challenges that smart cities face.  
Specifically, we compare how concerns about smart city technology 
play out in wealthy democracies3 and contrast this with the relatively 
unchallenged rollout of that technology in the People’s Republic of 
China.  These wealthy democracies are further divided into the 
European Union, where government regulation is stronger, and 
North America, where smart cities have faced less regulation, but 
perhaps, as a result, more popular resistance.4 
Part I of this Article reviews the rise of cities and smart city 
technology.  We assess the (over)promise of the technology and 
 
 1. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Hosed, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/16/hosed 
[https://perma.cc/9PSE-V88K]. 
 2. See Teena Maddox, Smart Cities: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC (July 16, 
2018), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/smart-cities-the-smart-persons-guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/G5G6-KYFL]. 
 3. This focus on wealthy democracies is a product of where the leading 
companies selling smart city technology are currently based. See These Are the Top 
Ten Companies That Build Smart Cities, SMART CITY HUB (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://smartcityhub.com/technology-innnovation/the-top-ten-companies-that-build-s
mart-cities/ [https://perma.cc/8SET-H73X]. 
 4. See generally Mario Weber & Ivana Podnar Žarko, A Regulatory View on 
Smart City Services, 19 SENSORS (BASEL) 415, 416 (2019). See also Michael M. 
Losavio et al., The Internet of Things and the Smart City: Legal Challenges with 
Digital Forensics, Privacy, and Security, 1 SECURITY & PRIVACY 1, 6 (2018). 
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examine the increasing pushback and skepticism that smart city 
projects and related technology have attracted.  In Part II, we turn 
our attention to the case of China, examining four different uses of 
smart city technology: Alibaba’s City Brain, the monitoring of 
Xinjiang, the social credit system, and other uses of facial recognition 
technology.  Part II then draws overall lessons from these Chinese 
cases. 
Part III of this Article considers possibilities for improving the use, 
regulation, and development of smart city technology in wealthy 
democracies.  First, we consider the important role surveillance 
intermediaries could play in protecting privacy.  Second, we look at 
the European Union and its General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).  Third, we ask whether it is, at this point, possible for 
companies based in democracies to catch up with the development of 
Chinese smart city technology.  Fourth, we look at how and where 
competition for smart city technology could play out in the rest of the 
world. 
Part IV provides recommendations about a possible way forward in 
the development of smart cities that would protect privacy and 
engender public trust and support. 
I. SMART CITIES 
Rapid global urbanization driven by overall population increase 
and rural-to-urban migration is expected to reach 60% of the world’s 
population by 2030, and 68% by 2050.5  Across the world, 
urbanization has been closely tied with lower overall poverty rates, 
higher educational levels, and higher living standards.  It is the main 
reason people choose to move to cities: the lure of higher-paying jobs 
and greater opportunities.  McKinsey projects that the top 100 global 
cities by economic growth will contribute 35% of the world’s GDP 
growth from 2007 to 2025.6  Cities are seen as engines of progress, 
improved services, and technological advancement. 
However, city development also produces unintended negative 
effects.  For example, cities are major contributors to climate change.  
 
 5. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD 
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 2018: HIGHLIGHTS, at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/421, 
Sales No. E19.XIII.6 (2019). 
 6. RICHARD DOBBS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., URBAN WORLD: MAPPING 
THE ECONOMIC POWER OF CITIES 1 (2011), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Urbanization/Ur
ban%20world/MGI_urban_world_mapping_economic_power_of_cities_full_report.as
hx [https://perma.cc/9M6G-8ZCF]. 
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While they house 55% of the world’s population7 on only 2% of the 
Earth’s surface, cities consume 78% of the world’s energy and 
produce more than 60% of the world’s greenhouse gases.8  City 
residents’ reliance on fossil fuels to drive their cars, heat their homes, 
and run their factories worsen air and water quality and harm wildlife 
and its habitats.9  According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), more than 80% of urban inhabitants are exposed to levels of 
air pollution above WHO limits which, in turn, increases the risk of 
stroke, heart disease, and other chronic and acute respiratory diseases 
especially for elderly, youth, and marginalized groups.10  Globally, 
urban areas have, on average, 50% less species richness11 than intact 
natural habitats.12  As Dr. Eric Strauss, executive director of the 
Center for Urban Resilience at Loyola Marymount University-Los 
Angeles, notes: “When you have an intact animal diversity, you 
control those zoonatic diseases without having to use as much 
pesticide.”13  More frequent and severe extreme weather, such as 
hurricanes, heat waves, and drought, have not only damaged 
infrastructure and food economies but have also widened 
socio-economic inequality between those who have the resources and 
physical strength to withstand it, and those who do not.14  The urban 
poor often live in areas of greatest risk (for example, older homes in 
 
 7. Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Urbanization, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 
2018), https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization [https://perma.cc/3SB4-QTAG]. 
 8. Cities and Pollution Contribute to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cities-pollution.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/ZS9P-UETT] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
 9. Urban Threats, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/habitats/urban-threats/ 
[https://perma.cc/778L-4LZA] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 10. WHO Global Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(2016), http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/T9SP-XYSR]. 
 11. Species richness is the number of different species in an ecosystem. J.A. 
Veech, Measuring Biodiversity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 287–95 
(Dominick Dellasala & Michael I. Goldstein eds., 2018). 
 12. German Center for Integrative Biodiversity Research, Urban Growth Causes 
More Biodiversity Loss Outside of Cities, EUREKALERT! (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-12/gcfi-ugc120619.php 
[https://perma.cc/2DWY-73DC]. 
 13. Steve Holt, Where Do Urban Animals Go When Their Habitats Disappear?, 
CITYLAB (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/environment/2017/11/where-do-urban-animals-go-when-thei
r-habitats-disappear/546002/ [https://perma.cc/3YRQ-654Q]. 
 14. See generally Kimberley Thomas et al., Explaining Differential Vulnerability 
to Climate Change: A Social Science Review, WILEY INTERDISC. REV. CLIMATE 
CHANGE, Nov. 5, 2018. 
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flood zones) and have fewer resources (such as home and health 
insurance), information, and financial networks to avoid, prepare for, 
and address those risks.15 
A. The Rise of Smart Cities 
The problems that have accompanied urbanization have forced 
many to rethink how we build and maintain cities.  Cities can still be 
an overall positive force, and proactive city leaders are increasingly 
galvanized to create change.  Mayors from all over the world are 
coming together to share ideas and solutions over their common 
urban problems.16  Despite differences in development levels, politics, 
and geographies, cities are increasingly expected to do more with 
fewer financial resources,17 poor infrastructure,18 and an aging 
workforce.19  For example, Indianapolis requires ten times the current 
budget to achieve basic fair conditions for roads,20 typical of many 
cities.  As Zach Adamson, a member of the Indianapolis City-County 
Council’s Public Works Committee, noted, “The city is always 
behind, there is not enough revenue to cover our needs.”21 
Organizations like the C40,22 Rockefeller Foundation,23 and 
Bloomberg Philanthropies24 have become bastions of mayoral 
 
 15. See S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality 6 
(U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 152, 2017). 
 16. See About Us, GLOBAL COVENANT MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY, 
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/5R77-E9AD] (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 17. See Michael Maciag, What Are Cities Spending Big On? Increasingly, It’s 
Debt., GOVERNING (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-legacy-cities-bills-debt.html 
[https://perma.cc/3Q9D-XXQW]. 
 18. See America’s Infrastructure Grade, ASCE’S 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REP. 
CARD, https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/americas-grades/ 
[https://perma.cc/5GSK-VV34] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 19. See Michael Maciag, The “Silver Tsunami” Has Arrived in Government, 
GOVERNING (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-government-retirement-survey-center-st
ate-local.html [https://perma.cc/V744-G86Z]. 
 20. John Tuohy, Indy’s Streets Are So Bad, Making Them ‘Fair’ Would Take 10 
Times the Current Budget, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/02/15/indys-streets-so-bad-making-them-fa
ir-would-take-10-times-current-budget/324044002/ [https://perma.cc/XWL5-XB6M]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. About C40, C40 CITIES, https://www.c40.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/BY3D-NRL5] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 23. About Us, ROCKEFELLER FOUND., 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/K7AS-A3DD] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
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collaboration and have heightened the sense of urgency and 
opportunity for cities to be transformative.  These coalitions have 
tried to take best practices and innovations from industry, both in 
process and in outcome, and seed them in cities.  Michael Bloomberg, 
former mayor of New York City, naturally brought his managerial 
style and industry expertise from running New York City, where he 
was famous for saying, “In God we trust.  Everyone else bring 
data.”25 
Industry, in turn, witnessed its own technological breakthroughs 
and was eager to proselytize their solutions and increase their sales, 
markets, and influence by working with and selling to cities.  IBM, for 
example, promised a “smarter planet and a new strategic agenda for 
progress and growth.”26  Cisco solutions claim that it “encapsulates a 
new way of thinking about how communities are designed, built, 
managed, and renewed to achieve social, economic, and 
environmental sustainability.”27  Start-ups, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and consultancies naturally joined, each offering 
their own solutions and analysis to support cities. 
It is this confluence of urgency and expectation in cities, and the 
increased ability with industry-led solutions and optimism, that 
birthed smart cities.28  By 2025, the smart cities market is estimated to 
be worth $2.4 trillion.29  The convergence is also resulting in more 
flexible and diverse jobs that are newly created or replacing 
lower-skilled jobs.30  McKinsey estimates that 15% of our global 
 
 24. About Us, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, https://www.bloomberg.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ULP-YSPL] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 25. Bye-Bye, Bloomberg, ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2013/11/02/bye-bye-bloomberg 
[https://perma.cc/A525-MTE9]. 
 26. IBM Builds a Smarter Planet, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/SGC6-KYWN] (last visited Jan 22, 2020). 
 27. Seungho Yoo, Songdo: The Hype and Decline of World’s First Smart City, in 
SUSTAINABLE CITIES IN ASIA 153 (Federico Caprotti & Li Yu eds., 2017). 
 28. See generally Mircea Eremia et al., The Smart City Concept in the 21st 
Century, 181 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 12 (2017). 
 29. See Pramod Borasi, Smart Cities Market by Functional Area (Smart 
Governance & Smart Education, Smart Energy, Smart Infrastructure, Smart 
Mobility, Smart Healthcare, Smart Building, and Others): Global Opportunity 
Analysis and Industry Forecast, 2018–2025, ALLIED MARKET RES. (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/smart-cities-market 
[https://perma.cc/S6JZ-KJRJ]. 
 30. See James Manyika & Kevin Sneader, AI, Automation, and the Future of 
Work: Ten Things to Solve For, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (June 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/ai-automation-and-the-fu
ture-of-work-ten-things-to-solve-for [https://perma.cc/N9DA-BC8N]. 
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workforce, or 400 million workers, could be displaced by automation 
from 2016–2030.31  However, the same McKinsey analysis shows an 
“additional labor demand of between 21 percent to 33 percent of the 
global workforce (555 million and 890 million jobs) to 2030, more 
than offsetting the numbers of jobs lost.”32  Many of the new jobs 
created are ones we currently have a hard time imagining and are 
based on emerging technology that is becoming part of our built 
environment.  For example, Accenture estimates that the 
fifth-generation wireless technology (5G) rollout could create 3 
million direct U.S. jobs and an additional 2.2 million jobs that support 
the 5G economic ecosystem.33 
B. The Overpromise of Smart Cities 
Nothing could be a clearer sign of the hype that surrounds the 
smart city than the multitude of definitions for “smart city” that exist; 
the term is most frequently used without any clear or consistent 
definition in mind.  In an article for the Journal of Urban Technology, 
Vito Albino, Umberto Berardi, and Rosa Maria Dangelico collected 
23 distinct definitions of smart cities from authoritative sources.34  
Liviu-Gabriel Cretu provides a useful breakdown of the two major 
trends in smart city thinking: “(1) smart cities should do everything 
related to governance and economy using new thinking paradigms 
and (2) smart cities are all about networks of sensors, smart devices, 
real-time data and ICT integration in every aspect of human life.”35 
In this Article, we eschew a specific definition in favor of 
considering examples and technologies that are included in projects 
or articles that brand themselves as being about smart cities.  If we 
were to exclude these for not fitting a narrower and more precise 
definition of smart city, we risk missing how less-related technology 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Urvashi Verma, 5G Rollout to Create 3 Million New Jobs, Adding $500 
Billion to the US Economy, CONNECTED REAL EST. MAG. (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.connectedremag.com/das-in-building-wireless/5g-rollout-to-create-3-milli
on-new-jobs-adding-500-billion-to-the-us-economy/ [https://perma.cc/A42J-F337]. 
 34. See Vito Albino et al., Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, Performance, 
and Initiatives, 22 J. URB. TECH. 3, 6–8 (2015). The earliest definition collected comes 
was published by R.E. Hall in 2000 and is fairly typical: “A city that monitors and 
integrates conditions of all of its critical infrastructures, including roads, bridges, 
tunnels, rails, subways, airports seaports, communications, water, power, even major 
buildings, can better optimize its resources, plan its preventive maintenance activities, 
and monitor security aspects while maximizing services to its citizens.” Id. at 6. 
 35. Liviu-Gabriel Cretu, Smart Cities Design Using Event-Driven Paradigm and 
Semantic Web, 16 INFORMATICA ECONOMICĂ 57, 57 (2012). 
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and examples get brought into the discourse on smart cities.  Two 
examples from the subsequent Section, Quayside’s wooden 
construction and the Facebook data breaches, illustrate how concepts 
that might not fit many definitions of smart city technology 
nevertheless may be held back by (in the case of the former) or 
contribute to (in the case of the latter) the pushback against smart 
cities. 
Smart city solutions were originally seen as a way to solve many of 
the problems plaguing cities.  With better technology and mastery of 
data analytics, cities could become more efficient at providing basic 
services like waste and recycling collection,36 identifying potholes,37 
and abating pests and rats.38  The technologies were also supposed to 
tackle larger problems like public safety and traffic congestion.  
McKinsey estimates that smart mobility applications (including 
smarter public transit, self-driving electric vehicles, ride-hailing, and 
car, bicycle, and scooter-sharing)39 have the potential to cut 
commuting times for developing cities by 15% to 20%.40 
However, almost as soon as smart city technologies began to be 
applied, it became apparent that the technology-driven approach of 
smart cities was insufficient to achieve cities’ goals; sensors designed 
to notify drivers of free parking spots or public charging stations for 
electric vehicles needed trained staff for installation and 
maintenance.41  While there were common problems, the one 
technology solution fits all approach was not effective — tech 
 
 36. See Donald Cambelin, Smarter Waste for the Smart City, COMPOLOGY (Sept. 
19, 2017), http://compology.com/blog/smarter-waste-for-the-smart-city 
[https://perma.cc/5NW6-FND6]. 
 37. See Theodora S. Brisimi et al., Sensing and Classifying Roadway Obstacles in 
Smart Cities: The Street Bump System, 4 IEEE ACCESS 1301, 1302 (2016). 
 38. See Linda Poon, Will Cities Ever Outsmart Rats?, CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2017/08/smart-cities-fight-rat-infestations-big-data/
535407/ [https://perma.cc/PH9G-B2TU]. 
 39. See Eric Hannon et al., An Integrated Perspective on the Future of Mobility, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/an-integrate
d-perspective-on-the-future-of-mobility [https://perma.cc/CRC4-HTV9]. 
 40. See Jonathan Woetzel et al., Smart City Technology for a More Liveable 
Future, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (June 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/
smart-cities-digital-solutions-for-a-more-livable-future 
[https://perma.cc/TMT2-S9MR]. 
 41. See Marcos Martínez Euklidiadas, Smart Cities That Failed along the Way, 
SMART CITY LAB (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://www.smartcitylab.com/blog/urban-environment/smart-cities-that-failed-along-
the-way/ [https://perma.cc/KK28-FK68]. 
2020]       SMARTER CITIES OR BIGGER BROTHER? 837 
companies and vendors were driven by the sales of their products and 
services, rather than by development, such that it became a race to 
have their technology adopted by as many cities as possible for 
domain supremacy.42  Cities purchased smart city technology falsely 
thinking that technology alone would make the city smart with 
limited knowledge in the application and usage of the technology, and 
left unsure of the exact problem they were trying to solve with its 
implementation.43  Smart city technology also widened inequalities 
within and between cities among those with the technology, 
connectivity, and knowledge to use it — and those without it.  For 
example, while Flint, Michigan’s water supply systems continued to 
deteriorate and poison its residents,44 200 miles away in South Bend, 
Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg’s administration was able to work with 
the University of Notre Dame to install sensors under manhole covers 
and implement a smart sewer system.45 
The smart cities backlash created new thinking about technology 
and its relationship with city development.  Smart cities became best 
thought of not as an end state, but a continuous improvement process 
that allows cities and communities of all sizes to pursue the most 
suitable integration of technology and data to increase their quality of 
life.  It concentrates on the local context and meeting the community 
where they are, as well as creative problem-solving with an enhanced 
toolkit that includes technology, data, as well as policy and financing 
solutions.  Smart cities, such as Smart Columbus,46 Chicago’s City 
Tech,47 and Dallas Innovation Alliance,48 are utilizing this kind of 
 
 42. See Laura Bliss, 2018 Was the Year of the Smart City Skeptic, CITYLAB (Dec. 
27, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/12/smart-city-uber-google-facebook-tech
nology-startup-solutions/579025/ [https://perma.cc/VRE8-NDH5]. 
 43. See Ben Green, Cities Are Not Technology Problems: What Smart Cities 
Companies Get Wrong, METROPOLIS (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.metropolismag.com/cities/ben-green-smart-enough-city/ 
[https://perma.cc/L8RE-WEBE]. 
 44. See Melissa Denchak, Flint Water Crisis: Everything You Need to Know, 
NAT’L RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/flint-water-crisis-everything-you-need-know 
[https://perma.cc/UP2N-LP7H]. 
 45. Debra Lam & John Wagner Givens, Small and Smart: Why and How Smart 
City Solutions Can and Should Be Adapted to the Unique Needs of Smaller Cities, 
12 NEW GLOBAL STUD. 21, 31–32 (2018). 
 46. See We Are Smart, Columbus, SMART COLUMBUS, 
https://smart.columbus.gov/about [https://perma.cc/9QDA-78QL] (last visited Feb. 
18, 2020). 
 47. See About City Tech, CITY TECH, http://www.citytech.org/about-overview 
[https://perma.cc/X6A6-M85T] (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
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empowering, people-centric framework, with new types of solutions 
and public-private partnerships.  Funded by public and private 
grants,49 the efforts include Multimodal Trip Planning Applications 
and common transportation payment systems,50 and developing 
demand management opportunities to reduce freight delivery 
congestion51 and open data initiatives.52  Yet, even more rapid than 
the progress of smart city thinking and projects has been the backlash 
against smart city technology, which we consider in the next Section. 
C. Smart City Skepticism 
“CityLab,” The Atlantic’s publication devoted to the future of 
cities, declared 2018 the year of the smart city skeptic.53  Their 
run-down of the challenges that smart cities face included both 
meaningful setbacks to an important smart city project as well as 
more general and less immediate concerns, such as how the rise of 
autonomous vehicles might change city planning.  The problems 
described were distressingly familiar, with violations of data privacy 
topping of the list.  Singled out was the revelation that Facebook had 
given its business partners access to personal data, exempting them 
from its own privacy rules.  In total, Facebook provided 150 
companies, including Netflix and Spotify, access to user data that 
included users’ private messages.54 
In some ways, it is misleading to name the above Facebook 
example, and other similar violations of online privacy, as a setback 
for smart cities.  Because the collection and analysis of data is at the 
core of smart cities, every blow toward citizen trust in data collection, 
analysis, and storage may ultimately have a significant impact on 
 
 48. See About DIA, DALLAS INNOVATION ALLIANCE, 
http://www.dallasinnovationalliance.com/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/C4P8-3RWQ] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 49. See, e.g., We Are Smart, Columbus, supra note 46. 
 50. See Multi-Modal Trip Planning Application & Common Payment System, 
SMART COLUMBUS, 
https://smart.columbus.gov/projects/multi-modal-trip-planning-application 
[https://perma.cc/KWG6-6A5Z] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
 51. See City Solutions, CITY TECH, http://www.citytech.org/city-solutions 
[https://perma.cc/H3PD-6J5S] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
 52. See Dallas OpenData, CITY OF DALLAS, https://www.dallasopendata.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/G46Q-A4EK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
 53. Bliss, supra note 42. 
 54. Gabriel J. X. Dance et al., As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an 
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public goodwill, which smart city projects in democracies must rely on 
to progress.  Indeed, this Article will show that it is precisely these 
types of concerns that are likely to impede the development of smart 
cities in democracies and ultimately allow the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) to control the future of smart city technology. 
Setbacks to smart city efforts may come in the form of revelations 
that damage general public opinion about emerging technologies 
rather than events that are specific to the development of any actual 
smart city projects.  Another major source of concern for smart city 
advocates and skeptics is that many smart city solutions were not as 
close at hand as previously thought.55  For example, after years of 
predictions that autonomous vehicles (AVs) were just over the 
horizon, stalled development and a fatal accident have suggested that 
self-driving cars are decades away, not years.56  AVs are more closely 
related to smart cities than social media, but would not necessarily 
hold back the other aspects of smart cities projects.  Here again, 
China seems to have an advantage.  As this Article demonstrates, 
Chinese citizens are less skeptical of new technologies, irrespective of 
how deeply flawed they may be.57 
Closer still to the core of smart city strategies, car-, bike-, and 
scooter-sharing services have also come under increased scrutiny.58  
Evidence that ridesharing exacerbates, rather than improves both 
traffic and carbon emissions — serious problems that smart cities are 
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meant to ameliorate — may be mounting.59  Micromobility solutions 
such as bike- and e-scooter-sharing services have faced criticism over 
blocking sidewalks, breaking traffic ordinances, increasing emergency 
room visits, and causing accidents.60  Cities, including West 
Hollywood, California, Nashville, Tennessee, and Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina, have forced e-scooter-sharing services out of their 
cities; other local governments, among them Columbia, South 
Carolina, and Davis, California passed preemptive scooter-sharing 
bans.61  Meanwhile, cities such as Atlanta, Georgia have pushed 
operators out with regulations, including high impound fees and a ban 
on night use.62  Yet, e-scooters remain popular and can likely help 
reduce carbon emissions.63  Most issues arise not from inherent 
problems in the technology, concept, or appeal, but in a lack of both 
physical and legal infrastructure.64  Laws and regulations that apply to 
e-scooters are often unclear, and cities and scooter companies appear 
to be tacitly acknowledging, if not encouraging, rule-breaking by 
scooter riders.  Mandates to wear helmets, stay off of sidewalks, and 
read voluminous terms and conditions are “more honored in the 
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breach than in the observance.”65  In this sense, e-scooters neatly 
embody the current state of most smart cities technology — an 
emerging technological solution lacking sufficient regulatory, legal, 
and physical infrastructure, and heavily dependent on public opinion 
for its continued existence and expansion. 
Most ominously for smart city advocates, however, is the fact that 
the largest smart city project in North America has come under heavy 
public criticism.  The Toronto Quayside project by Sidewalk Labs (a 
subsidiary of Alphabet, Google’s parent company), which was 
supposed to be the first neighborhood built “from the internet up,”66 
experienced several major setbacks.67  First, the board of Waterfront 
Toronto, the organization administering the project, experienced a 
series of public resignations and firings related to concerns over 
Quayside.68  Saadia Muzaffar, a member of Waterfront Toronto’s 
Digital Strategy Advisory Panel, levied a very public resignation, 
citing “a blatant disregard for resident concerns about data and digital 
infrastructure.”69  Second, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
filed a suit against Waterfront Toronto in addition to the 
governments of Toronto, Ontario, and Canada.70  The suit alleges 
that the “Quayside Agreements empower Sidewalk Labs and others 
to effect historically unprecedented, non-consensual, inappropriate 
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mass-capture surveillance and [the] commoditization of personal data 
of individuals who live in, work in or visit Quayside.”71  As a result of 
the popular backlash, the Quayside project has been significantly 
scaled back.72 
To a certain extent, the setback of some smart cities technology 
and projects, like burdensome regulations on micromobility solutions 
and truncations to the Quayside project, was the inevitable result of a 
bubble of excitement and hype that was unsustainable and bound to 
burst.  Yet, many of these specific problems are far from inevitable 
and are primarily issues tied to public opinion.  Concerns about smart 
city technology, especially as related to privacy, should not be as 
damaging as they first appear and should be surmountable for two 
major reasons. 
First, most of the setbacks related to smart city technology are 
centered around privacy concerns that, while important, reflect only a 
subset of smart city technologies.  From wooden building construction 
to public transit optimization, to smart sewers and trashcans, many of 
the technologies with the most potential are uncontroversial.  They 
raise few, if any, privacy concerns, especially if designed correctly 
from the outset.  Returning to the example of South Bend, Indiana, 
the installed sensors under manhole covers dramatically increased the 
efficiency of water management in their sewers and allowed them to 
forgo expensive infrastructure upgrades.73  As with any technology 
that attaches internet-enabled sensors to objects, many pieces of 
smart city technology are part of the Internet of Things (IoT).  But 
sensors installed inside trashcans or under manhole covers generally 
do not present privacy concerns or a security danger if hacked.  
Projects can disentangle uncontroversial smart cities technologies 
such as improved construction techniques and materials, increased 
energy efficiency, and less-problematic sensors.  Projects that focus on 
timber construction, optimizing bus routes, and unobjectionable 
sensors can advance while leaving behind technologies that rely on 
facial recognition, collecting personal data from smartphones, and 
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other sources.  Even if privacy concerns related to personal data 
cannot be overcome, it should be possible to move forward with many 
innovations, which raise fewer objections. 
Second, privacy issues around smart cities arise primarily from 
concern over what private companies, such as Google’s Sidewalk 
Labs, will do with the potentially tremendous quantity, and 
unprecedented quality, of data that smart city infrastructure allows 
them to collect.74 Considering the high costs and technology involved 
in most smart city projects, private companies are probably an 
inevitable part of advancing smart cities.  In the United States, 
repeated revelations about how large technology companies collect, 
store, use, and abuse our data has damaged the public’s trust.75  Yet, 
stricter laws and enforcement in the European Union have led to a 
higher level of public trust that private companies will handle their 
data appropriately — and face repercussions if they do not.76  While it 
would be an uphill battle, companies and governments in North 
America need to help improve attitudes toward smart city technology 
by building a successful track record of protecting people’s data, 
thereby making the public more willing to trust smart cities with 
increased data collection.  Increased trust that data is sufficiently 
protected will ultimately increase people’s trust in the companies 
collecting such data, as well as the government’s regulation of these 
companies. 
Increased skepticism over and pushback to even fairly 
straightforward applications of smart cities technologies seems likely 
to delay the development and implementation of smart cities in 
democracies.  In a liberal democracy with a robust rule of law, new 
technology that interacts with the public sphere, as most smart city 
technology does, requires at least a reasonable amount of public 
acceptance of the new technology.  This trust can be built with 
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increased transparency, education, and open dialogue, which the 
public values but is ultimately a time-consuming process.  The idea 
that deliberative processes in democracies would delay development 
that otherwise could rapidly move ahead has been seen in previous 
instances — as has the fact that the PRC often ignores these concerns 
and speeds ahead.  For example, in 2008, The Economist noted that 
“it took as long to conduct a public inquiry into the proposed 
construction of Heathrow’s Terminal Five as it took to build Beijing’s 
new airport terminal from scratch.”77  Because the concerns raised by 
smart cities are newer and more complex, the time gap between 
development in democracies and China is likely to be, and become, 
even wider. 
Privacy concerns can hold up the development of smart city 
projects in part because many smart city innovations are popularly 
seen as making a relatively small contribution, or even as providing a 
frivolous luxury.  Yet, delays in the development of smart cities 
projects are potentially incredibly damaging for two reasons.  First, 
some of the problems that smart cities help address, especially climate 
change,78 are so acute that there is little time to lose.  Second, if 
companies in the United States and other democracies are 
substantially delayed in their development of smart cities projects, 
this will only increase the advantage of companies that are based in 
the PRC, which will then increase the use of Chinese smart cities 
technology across the world.79  As this Article argues, the technology 
developed and sold by PRC-based companies is likely to lack basic 
privacy protections, empower authoritarians, and perhaps even make 
countries who utilize the technology vulnerable to the PRC. 
D. Privacy Challenges for Smart Cities 
Because almost any definition of smart cities involves the effective 
collection and use of data to improve city governance and services, 
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concerns about data and privacy are inevitable and imminently 
reasonable.  According to Lilian Edwards, Professor of 
E-Governance at the University of Strathclyde, the key security 
challenges faced by smart cities are: (1) a lack of meaningful consent; 
(2) private data collected from public interactions; (3) privatization of 
both infrastructure and data; (4) repurposing data from the IoT; and 
(5) storage of data in the cloud.80  There is no perfect solution to 
these problems; a balance needs to be struck between protecting 
people’s data and using data for the public good, from fighting 
climate change to improving city services.  The costs in terms of lost 
privacy and other concerns need to be balanced with the lost 
opportunity cost of not implementing these technologies.  Giving up 
on technologies that help fight climate change or provide better 
public transit and other city services to underserved neighborhoods 
may be too high a price to pay to protect certain types of personal 
data.  More important than any specific solution to these challenges is 
the need for ongoing dialogue about how to handle data in an 
inclusive, consistent, and transparent manner, which will, in turn, 
facilitate meaningful trust among the public. 
Public backlash against smart city projects has the potential to 
derail even uncontroversial elements of smart cities.  The Quayside 
project, for example, intends to take unprecedented steps by using 
wood as its primary building material for buildings up to 35 stories.81  
Because concrete is a major contributor to carbon dioxide emissions, 
and wood is renewable, lighter, and an excellent way of storing excess 
carbon, the Quayside project could pilot innovation by making a 
major contribution towards climate change reduction.82  However, 
while Sidewalk Labs tried to highlight its innovative wood 
construction, both the public and its own advisory panel pushed back 
against the project based on other privacy concerns83 regarding how 
data would be collected and used by a private company.84  Saadia 
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Muzaffar, a member of Waterfront Toronto’s Digital Strategy 
Advisory Panel who resigned, described the problem with the public 
consultation process. She argued that instead of addressing privacy 
concerns, “time was spent [by Waterfront Toronto] . . . talking about 
buildings made of wood and the width of one-way streets, things no 
one has contested or expressed material concern for in this entire 
process.”85  If Sidewalk Labs and other companies spearheading 
smart cities efforts86 cannot create strategies to overcome concerns 
about their projects, especially related to privacy, then even the 
popular elements of their plans might be abandoned — or at least 
significantly delayed.  The cost to society and the planet in terms of 
lost opportunity could be significant.  The opportunities that such 
delays present to Chinese companies, on the other hand, which have 
less concern for privacy and transparency, could be even larger.87 
II. CHINA 
Part II examines the development of smart city technology in the 
PRC.  We give particular attention to four cases: Alibaba’s City 
Brain, the monitoring of Xinjiang, China’s social credit system, and 
other uses of facial recognition technology.  Finally, we summarize 
and draw conclusions based on what these fairly different applications 
of technology tell us as a whole. 
Across a variety of industries that include smart cities and related 
technologies, China’s companies are increasingly competitive with 
their counterparts from North America, out-innovating them in a 
variety of fields, from artificial intelligence to 5G.88  Several factors 
help make China a world-leader in smart cities: First, the tremendous 
size of the Chinese market, in terms of both population and GDP.89  
Second, the state uses strategic investment, tax incentives, and a 
variety of other inducements and policies to support Chinese 
companies, seeking to make the PRC a world-wide leader in 
technology and innovation.  The “Made in China 2025” initiative has 
formalized these policies into a prominent national campaign aimed 
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at making China a global technological superpower and costing the 
state at least hundreds of billions of dollars.90  Third, the state further 
assists Chinese companies by blocking foreign firms from operating in 
spaces that it deems “sensitive,” especially search and social media.  
Prominent examples include the blocking of Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter.91  This not only allows China greater control over industries 
and applications it deems “sensitive,” but has allowed other Chinese 
technology companies to fill a space that American firms otherwise 
dominate in most of the world.  Fourth, and most important to our 
argument, Chinese companies enjoy an advantage when it comes to 
smart cities technology because they face relatively little need to deal 
with issues related to privacy, public opinion, or other concerns about 
the implementation of new technology.  Chinese companies working 
in conjunction with the state can power ahead in implementing 
technology with little concern for public opinion and even less worry 
about legal or political setbacks of the kind Quayside faced. 
The PRC’s rapid rise to dominance in several high technology 
fields, especially renewable energy, provides an instructive example 
for the possible future of many smart city technologies.  Beginning in 
the 1990s, China invested heavily in renewable energy with a 
particular focus on photovoltaic panels (PVs).  In total, the Chinese 
state may have contributed as much as $47 billion to build its solar 
manufacturing industry.92  The results were even more impressive.  
“Between 2008 and 2013, China’s fledgling solar-electric panel 
industry dropped world prices by 80 percent.”93  China leapfrogged 
previous market leaders — the United States, Germany, and Japan — 
not only in production but also in patents.  Its current market 
dominance in the industry seems, at least for the time being, 
unassailable. 
It is often claimed that the Chinese are more likely to embrace new 
technology than people in other countries, especially wealthy 
democracies, because the population as a whole is less distrusting of 
it.  “‘Chinese are much more willing to try something new just 
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because it looks cool,’ said Andy Tian, Chief Executive of 
Beijing-based Asia Innovations Group, which runs mobile 
applications.  ‘It sounds superficial. It is superficial. But that’s the 
driver of progress [in the PRC] in a lot of cases.’”94  This general 
enthusiasm for technology may help overcome concerns about 
privacy and other issues.  Some data likewise suggests that Chinese 
consumers are more comfortable with a variety of technologies likely 
to figure into smart city projects.95  In the most extreme cases, 
Chinese and Americans take the opposite view of technology.  A 
survey by OC&C Strategy Consultants found that 70% of Americans 
say that they would not trust an autonomous vehicle, while 72% of 
Chinese said they would.96  Yet, not all results are clear cut, and the 
causes and nature of Chinese attitudes towards privacy and 
technology is worth further examination. 
In 2018, the CEO of Baidu, China’s biggest search engine, publicly 
stated: “I think Chinese people are more open or less sensitive about 
the privacy issue.  If they are able to trade privacy for convenience, 
for safety, for efficiency, in a lot of cases they’re willing to do that.”97  
The comments reflected a reasonably common point of view but were 
also met with significant public criticism.  When it comes to online 
privacy, the gap between Chinese and Western attitudes is less 
extreme but still appears to be significant.  A 2019 survey by Ipsos 
Group found that only 11% of Chinese were very concerned about 
their online privacy, compared to 26% of respondents in the United 
States.98  The overall numbers of those who were concerned or very 
concerned were similar at 68% and 78% respectively.99  Chinese lack 
of concern seems even more dramatic because it puts China in similar 
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territory, primarily with wealthy and well-run democracies such as 
Japan, Germany, and Sweden.100  Countries more similar to China, in 
terms of development and political system, tended towards the other 
end of the scale; in Egypt, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico, 
Korea, Brazil, and Tunisia, over 40% reported being very concerned 
about online privacy.101  That China looks more like well-run wealthy 
democracies than developed countries hints at a theme that will be 
examined later in this Article: for a middle-income authoritarian 
regime, China seems to be uniquely capable and trusted by its own 
people.102 
As China becomes wealthier, better-educated, and more 
tech-savvy, it is possible that attitudes towards online privacy are 
shifting.  Both the Ipsos poll and a report by Kantar China  Insights, a 
media consultancy, suggest that concern about personal privacy 
online is growing.103 There is even evidence that the Chinese state is 
responding to increasing concerns about online data privacy.104  
China’s new e-commerce law, which took effect in 2019, contains 
important provisions for protecting the privacy of consumers.105 
How any given Chinese person or the country as a whole feels 
about sacrificing privacy may matter less when the state and powerful 
tech companies act as though Chinese care little about privacy.  
Ordinary Chinese people have relatively little control over the rapidly 
growing use of a wide variety of technologies with the serious 
potential to infringe on their privacy.106  In meaningful ways, Chinese 
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citizens have already been forced to accept technology107 that many in 
developed democracies remain skeptical of or even openly resist.108  
In major Chinese cities, mobile phone-based payment systems, like 
Alipay and WeChat Pay, are so pervasive that using cash or credit 
cards falls between inconvenient and impossible, even for low-value 
face-to-face transactions like buying a bottle of water.  Similarly, 
WeChat (Weixin) — an application that serves messaging, payment, 
and many other functions — is so ubiquitous that it is difficult to live 
a normal life or conduct business without it.109  It is possible, 
therefore, that to the extent the Chinese do have laxer attitudes about 
potential privacy-infringing technology, this is a consequence of an 
environment where there is relatively little choice but to opt into such 
technology, irrespective of overriding privacy concerns.  Additionally, 
the market dominance of a few national champions with close ties to 
the state gives consumers few choices in terms of competing providers 
that might take their privacy more seriously.110 
The advantage that Chinese companies have as a result of being 
able to largely ignore privacy concerns and many other regulatory 
hurdles is clear to Chinese companies, the state that supports them, 
and their competitors.111  In the words of Dong Tao, Vice Chairman 
for Greater China at Credit Suisse Private Banking Asia Pacific, “I’m 
not saying Chinese companies are better than American companies, 
I’m not saying Chinese engineers are better than American engineers.  
What will make China be big in AI and big data is: China has no 
serious law protecting data privacy.”112  As the following Sections 
show, these advantages allow for Chinese companies to be involved in 
projects that companies in Europe or North America could not even 
contemplate. 
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It is unclear, however, if all the advantages that Chinese companies 
currently enjoy will last.  Perhaps precisely because it is not a 
democracy, the Chinese state is very sensitive to public opinion.113  Its 
supportive attitude of companies that care little for its citizens’ 
privacy may change if the state becomes seriously concerned that 
attitudes of average Chinese people are shifting to more closely 
match the higher levels of concern visible in other middle-income 
countries.  This would be similar to improvements made in air quality 
that China experienced as a result of public backlash against 
high-levels of air pollution, helping to shift the government’s 
previously laissez-faire attitude about heavy polluters.114 
In the Sections below, this Article considers three of the PRC’s 
largest-scale and most Orwellian uses of data in the public sphere, as 
well as several smaller-scale examples of the use of facial recognition 
technology in the PRC. 
A. City Brain 
If Sidewalk Lab’s Quayside project is the ambitious but 
problematic poster child for smart cities in wealthy democracies, it 
pales in comparison to China’s most important smart city project, 
Alibaba’s City Brain.115  According to Xian-Sheng Hua of Alibaba 
Group’s DAMO Academy (Academy for Discovery, Adventure, 
Momentum, and Outlook): 
City Brain is an end-to-end system whose goal is to glean 
irreplaceable values from big city data, specifically from videos, with 
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the assistance of rapidly evolving AI technologies and fast-growing 
computing capacity.  From cognition to optimization, to 
decision-making, from search to prediction and ultimately, to 
intervention, City Brain improves the way we manage the city, as 
well as the way we live in it.116 
In short, City Brain appears to be an effort to collect, consolidate, 
analyze, and implement as much data relevant to city functions as 
digitally possible. 
Currently, City Brian has five major applications: (1) monitoring 
city “vital signs” such as traffic across multiple modes of transport; (2) 
monitoring for public security purposes; (3) improving traffic on a 
micro-level (controlling traffic lights and transit routes and 
departures); (4) route optimization for emergency response vehicles; 
and (5) assisting with urban planning.117  According to Alibaba, 
“utilizing comprehensive real-time city data, City Brain holistically 
optimizes urban public resources by instantly correcting defects in 
urban operations.  This has led to numerous breakthroughs in urban 
government models, service models, and industrial development.”118  
As with Quayside and other smart cities projects in wealthy 
democracies, many of the most beneficial applications of the 
technology, such as optimizing traffic, emergency services, and public 
transport, are likely to be popular and are relatively unobjectionable 
from a privacy standpoint.  The public security applications, however, 
are a very different matter. 
In a way, City Brain is the logical conclusion of an effort that 
started on the other side of the world when the United Kingdom 
installed four closed-circuit cameras in Trafalgar Square in 1960.119  
Since then, the United Kingdom has led the world as one of the most 
surveilled countries, with a total of around 5.9 million closed-circuit 
television cameras.120  While the amount of video collected is 
enormous, however, the system is old, “a muddle of more than a 
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thousand video formats, poor quality footage and manual 
processing.”121  The footage is used primarily as a tool for review by 
specially trained police to use after an incident has already taken 
place.  “In the aftermath of the London riots in August 2011 police 
scoured through more than 200,000 hours of CCTV to identify 
suspects.  Around 5,000 offenders were found by trawling through the 
footage, after a process that took more than five months.”122  While 
meaningful efforts to modernize, improve, and automate at least parts 
of the United Kingdom’s dilapidated system are underway, the 
process will be expensive and lengthy.  As the United Kingdom 
advances these efforts, it has already experienced pushback about the 
use of facial recognition and biometric tracking information that the 
CCTV network would need to become more automated and produce 
data in real-time.123  In particular — with the details of the United 
Kingdom’s post-Brexit relationship with Europe still to be worked 
out — the United Kingdom’s use of these technologies will face 
meaningful constraints in the form of the European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which this Article will later 
examine.124 
City Brain’s public security functions are essentially trying to 
recreate the efforts of the London police in 2011, but with 
automation, programming City Brain to work in real-time, and even 
make predictions.  This level of surveillance may have already, or may 
not, surpass that of regimes like Communist East Germany125 or, 
indeed, Mao-era China.126  But even if it does not, City Brain efforts 
offer massive advantages in terms of efficiency and precision.  At the 
time of its collapse, East Germany had more than 260,000 people, or 
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2% of its population, working full or part-time for its secret police.127  
The comparable figure for the PRC would be approximately 28 
million, about four times the number of civil servants currently 
working in China.128  City Brain would seem to be able to provide a 
similar level of surveillance at a tiny fraction of the cost. Additionally, 
according to Alibaba’s researchers, the technology is both much 
faster and much better at identifying people than a human; they claim 
that the system was able to locate people in security footage from a 
single photo, even if that photo was from behind.129  This 
identification technology has many worthy applications, from 
preventing terrorist attacks and mass shootings to finding missing 
children.  Nevertheless, the potential for an authoritarian regime that 
could identify and track the comings and goings of every individual in 
a city in real-time is staggering and perhaps not that far off.  The 
further the technology spreads beyond China, the more authoritarians 
or potential authoritarians could have access to this surveillance of 
unprecedented efficiency and effectiveness. 
As with many smart cities or big data projects, City Brain collects 
and stores large amounts of data on the cloud.130  The storage of such 
large amounts of potentially sensitive data poses challenges — even 
for companies in jurisdictions that are more concerned with data 
security and privacy.  But large Chinese technology companies’ lack 
of concern with privacy, and their close relationship with the state, 
make these concerns even more serious.131  Without a government 
regulating the collection, storage, and protection of data and with 
little fear of retribution from a state heavily invested in its success, 
Alibaba — or any company in a similar position — has little reason to 
take adequate measures to secure its data and systems.  Even fairly 
basic smart traffic control systems offer a prime target for hackers,132 
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and as one of the most ambitious systems ever conceived, City Brian 
provides an expansive attack surface area. 
Concern that Alibaba and those that buy its smart cities products 
will not take the security of its data seriously is more than theoretical.  
In 2019, John Wethington of data security firm Condition:Black 
discovered that a sizable Chinese smart city database was easily 
accessible online, not even protected by a password.133  Although the 
owner of the data was not explicit, it “made several references to the 
tech giant’s artificial intelligence-powered cloud platform, City Brain, 
but Alibaba later denied its platform was used.”134  When the content 
of the database became clear, it not only raised concerns that such a 
large and sensitive dataset was going unprotected but also revealed 
the worrying scope of the data being collected and stored. 
The unprotected data Wethington found was produced by the 
continual monitoring of “residents around at least two small housing 
communities in eastern Beijing, the largest of which is Liangmaqiao, 
known as the city’s embassy district.”135  The data is collected through 
various means, most notably cameras enabled with facial recognition 
software.  Using the data, it would be possible to construct a picture 
of an individual’s coming and goings.  It also identified the ethnicity 
of individuals, a worrying prospect given China’s recent record of 
targeting Muslims for repression,136 but also in many other 
contexts.137  More concerning still, the data collected by cameras and 
processed by facial recognition software was linked to government 
records, including national identification card numbers and police 
records.138  This clue also makes it likely that the Alibaba customer to 
whom the data belonged was a Chinese local government.139  In a 
similar breach in January 2020, City Brain data from the Chinese 
cities of Luzhou and Hangzhou were uncovered.140 
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Yet the worrying implications of City Brain’s public security 
features and overall concerns about data collection and security are 
easy to overlook in favor of the tremendous potential of its other 
functions.  Alibaba claims that its system is able to integrate data 
from map tools, traffic police microblog accounts, and videos to 
optimize traffic lights, taxi dispatch, and public transportation to 
reduce traffic, improve emergency vehicle response times, and reduce 
public transit delays.141  The system was purported to be highly 
effective in its test city of Hangzhou, a major metropolis in China’s 
silicon valley.  After City Brain was given control of 104 traffic lights 
in one district of the city, traffic was reduced by 15% in the first 
year.142 Additionally, in Hangzhou, ambulance response times 
dropped by 50%, and the accuracy of real-time traffic incident 
detection reached 95%.143  In Shanghai, optimizing traffic light timing 
dropped travel time by 8% and roadway congestion by 15%.144  Better 
still for traffic-clogged metropolises, researchers claimed that in 
Suzhou, in Jiangsu Province, “dynamic adjustment of bus departure 
time increased the number of people taking buses by 17%.”145  If 
these kinds of improvements are substantiated and reproducible in 
other contexts, cities around the world will and should be clamoring 
to get their own City Brains. 
While the scope and scale of City Brain are impressive, it is the 
possibility for the rapid spread of the system that makes it perhaps 
the most important smart cities technology on the planet.  A system 
that provides cities some relief from congestion without major 
infrastructure spending could be incredibly tempting even for a 
wealthy democracy that takes transparency and data privacy 
seriously.  For the rapidly growing and increasingly congested cities of 
the developing world (the four cities with the world’s worst traffic are 
Mumbai, Bogota, Lima, and New Delhi),146 many of which have 
limited legal and democratic constrains, the appeal of City Brain may 
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be irresistible.  City Brain is already being deployed in cities across 
China, including Xiong’an New Area (near Beijing and Tianjin), 
Chongqing, Macau, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Suzhou.147  
Beyond China, Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur, has already signed 
a contract to implement City Brain,148 and if things go according to 
plan, this will be only the tip of the iceberg. Alibaba claims it “is 
already working with 120,000 developers and 2700 academic institutes 
and businesses from 77 countries and regions.”149 
Utility notwithstanding, there are good reasons to believe that the 
Chinese state can and will take advantage of the incredible data 
gathering power of City Brain.  According to Christopher Ashley 
Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and 
Non-Proliferation at the United States Department of State: 
Firms such as Huawei, Tencent, ZTE, Alibaba, and Baidu have no 
meaningful ability to tell the Chinese Communist Party “no” if 
officials decide to ask for their assistance . . . . Such aid may not 
necessarily occur routinely, but it certainly can occur — and 
presumably will — whenever the Party considers this useful and 
cares to demand it.150 
That the Chinese state will be able to use City Brain and similar 
technologies to help it monitor and control its citizens, therefore, is a 
virtual certainty.  Yet, as City Brain spreads to cities across the globe, 
it is possible that the Chinese state will use its influence on Alibaba 
and other companies to gain an equal level of access in any and every 
city that implements Chinese smart city technology.  This fear echoes 
and amplifies the existing concerns about the spread of Huawei’s 5G 
technology, which are considered below.151 
Further legitimate fears arise from concerns that as this technology 
spreads, City Brain-like systems might be built and controlled by 
purely private interests.  In the words of John Wethington: 
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[I]t’s not difficult to imagine the potential for abuse that would exist 
if a platform like this were brought to the U.S. with no civilian and 
governmental regulations or oversight . . . while businesses cannot 
simply plug in to FBI data sets today it would not be hard for them 
to access other state or local criminal databases and begin to create 
their own profiles on customers or adversaries.152 
The potential for the private use and abuse of this data could be 
even greater in developing nations where governments would have 
less technical and regulatory ability or inclination to pushback against 
wealthy and powerful companies, most of which would be based in 
other countries. 
B. Monitoring Muslims 
China’s Western provinces, especially Xinjiang, have long been 
areas discontented with PRC rule, which is both a cause and a result 
of repression against Muslim minorities.153  The region has a long but 
troubled relationship with Beijing, with the Qing and subsequent 
Republican governments often only loosely controlling the region.154  
This culminated in a strong nationalist movement and even a brief 
period of independence in the 1930s and 1940s.155  Since the rise of 
the PRC, however, Beijing has exerted increasingly tighter control 
over the region.156  After 9/11, the PRC used the threat of Islamic 
terrorism to justify its repression, yet most of the discontent has 
surfaced in the form of ethnic riots, such as a major outbreak in the 
summer of 2009.157 
The repression has stepped up since 2017, with at least 800,000 
Muslims being detained in “re-education” camps.158  In some ways, 
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this is just a particularly extreme phase in ongoing cycles of 
repression.  In 2010, for example, Beijing essentially turned off the 
internet in Xinjiang for ten months.159  What makes this round of 
repression different and important for considering the future of smart 
cities is that the detentions and repression seem to be quietly 
supported by a sophisticated and massive effort to use data collection 
to target and sustain it. 
In early 2018, Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international 
NGO, downloaded a smartphone application designed for use by 
Chinese officials in Xinjiang.  The application is part of China’s 
Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), an overarching system 
of mass surveillance in Xinjiang, and seems to have been created by a 
major Chinese military contractor.  The goal of this effort seems to be 
an unprecedented level of surveillance and control of everyone in the 
province.  Working with a Berlin-based security company to decipher 
and reverse engineer the application, HRW was able to assemble a 
picture of a remarkably data-intensive program of mass surveillance 
underway in Xinjiang.160 
The IJOP, in large part, appears to be an effort to assemble every 
piece of information the government can learn about residents of 
Xinjiang, but what makes it so unprecedented is the overwhelming 
number of data sources the application can draw on.161  Starting in 
2017, authorities in Xinjiang began collecting biometrics, including 
DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types of all residents 
in the region between the ages of 12 and 65.162  Additional 
information collected includes height, religious dress, beard length, 
electricity and gas usage, package deliveries, use of a home’s back 
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versus the front door, movements around cities and the province, 
police records, addresses, vehicle registration, as well as details on 
trips abroad.163 
The breadth of the data collected is even more staggering once the 
detail of the information becomes clear.  Information on packages, 
for example, includes not only basic information on the sender, 
intended recipient, and delivery company but also includes who 
received the package upon delivery, the date and time, X-rays, and 
photos of it.164  Information on gas and electricity usage is presumably 
drawn from utility companies and financial information from banks, 
both of which are partially — if not completely — state-owned.165  
Information on the sending and delivery of packages is added and 
must come, at least in part, from private delivery companies.  
Cameras equipped with facial recognition, cross-referenced with 
existing government biometric data, provide much of the most 
important information on a person’s comings and goings.166  Physical 
checkpoints have been set up all over Xinjiang to check IDs, often in 
conjunction with facial recognition.  Additionally, these checkpoints 
seem to have been quietly equipped with “data doors,” special 
machines that detect and log the MAC addresses and IMEI numbers 
of any phones that pass through the checkpoint.167  Similarly, the 
IJOP application seems to pick up and log wireless signals and their 
security features (a process called “wardriving”).168  While this level 
of data collection would certainly be ripe for a legal challenge 
elsewhere, even in China, it seems likely that the IJOP violates 
relatively limited restrictions on state surveillance.169  Yet, mounting a 
legal or political challenge to the system would almost certainly be 
both dangerous and futile.  While many actions of the local Chinese 
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state can successfully and safely be challenged in court,170 more 
politically sensitive cases, especially those relating to ethnic 
minorities, are beyond the pale.  Taking such a case to court could 
lead to a wide variety of repressive responses from the state against 
both plaintiffs and their lawyers, including criminal prosecution.171 
Once assembled, the information collected by the IJOP is used to 
identify “suspicious” individuals or situations.172  Given the incredible 
breadth and depth of data available to it, the IJOP is surprisingly 
mechanistic in determining which individuals or situations are worthy 
of further scrutiny.173  Instead of the big-data-worthy algorithms we 
might expect, the application seems to use “simple conditional 
statements — if a, then b (for example, if the person who drives the 
car is not the same as the person to whom the car is registered, then 
investigate this person).”174  Having identified a person or situation 
for further review, the application then prompts low-level local 
officials to investigate.  A pair of mock examples from HRW’s 
reverse engineering of the application provides a sense of how the 
application is meant to function.  The first example shows the extent 
to which investigations are prompted purely by when and where 
people are picked up by automated surveillance, such as facial 
recognition systems and data doors.  This seems to work in 
combination with conclusions drawn from algorithms that glean 
characteristics like ethnicity and religiosity based on personal 
appearance: “suspicious person Zhang San, whose address is Xinjiang 
Urumqi, ID number 653222198502043265, phone number 
18965983265.  That person has repeatedly appeared in inappropriate 
locations, and he displays [or his clothing shows] strong 
religiousness.”  A second example shows how the application prompts 
officials to collect more data: “Suspicious person Maimaiti Muhemuti, 
who originally lives in Xinjiang’s Urumqi, ID number 
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653222198502043215, phone number 13803021458. Report time: 
2017-09-25 14:01:53 [Mission] text: Please carefully investigate 
whether he still lives in Urumqi and investigate his family 
situation.”175  While this overall program of mass surveillance is 
overseen by the Public Security Bureau (the local police), personnel 
from other government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public 
institutions have also been used to surveil people.176  Surveillance 
may also include extended home visits,177 which in 2017 amounted to 
an attempt to put one million government officials in the homes of 
Xinjiang residents.178 
Visits by the prompted officials are meant to produce yet more 
information, which seems to be the main purpose of the IJOP 
application.179  Officials are urged to add varied information to the 
IJOP through the application, from text and drop-down menus to 
audio and photos.180  The investigation can also include “a phone 
search for software, network tools, or content that is problematic.”181  
Fifty-one network tools are flagged as suspicious, including tools for 
circumventing online censorship, such as Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs), and apps that allow for encrypted communication, like 
WhatsApp and Viber.182  The surveillance does not end with the 
targeted minorities. 
The app also scores government officials on their performance in 
fulfilling tasks and is a tool for higher-level supervisors to assign 
tasks to, and keep tabs on the performance of, lower-level officials. 
The IJOP application, in part, aims to control government officials 
to ensure that they are efficiently carrying out the government’s 
repressive orders.183 
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While IJOP is likely to stay limited to Xinjiang or perhaps other 
minority-heavy areas of China, for the time being, the authoritarian 
possibilities its example hints at are terrifyingly Orwellian. 
C. Social Credit System 
Although it is currently only peripherally related to core smart city 
functions and extensively covered in both popular and academic 
publications, no discussion about data security in the PRC could be 
complete without a brief mention of China’s rapidly expanding social 
credit systems (SCS).  The “Planning Outline for the Construction of 
a Social Credit System,” released in 2014 by the State Council (the 
PRC’s chief administrative authority), provides an authoritative 
direction on what the PRC seeks to accomplish with SCS.184 
[The plan] focused on the creation of the underlying information 
infrastructure that would be required for the system’s successful 
rollout.  It systematically provided for standardized means to record 
credit-related information in different sections of the administration, 
databases to store this information at the central and local levels, the 
establishment of credit reporting mechanisms to enable public 
access to the information, as well as information sharing processes in 
order to counter the siloing of data within the bureaucracy.185 
This data is then used to implement a system of rewards and 
punishments implemented with implications for interactions with 
both the state and the market.  Black (bad) and red (good) lists would 
be created to punish and reward people.186  Being on the blacklist 
could result in serious consequences for an individual, and even their 
family who might find themselves “unable to purchase high-speed 
train tickets, fly on an airplane, or send [their] kids to a private 
school.”187  Despite assertions to the contrary, especially in the 
popular press, what does not seem to be present in the creation of the 
SCS are the types of big data algorithmic analyses that are at work in 
the City Brain project.188  Essentially, the SCS appears to be a far 
broader and more authoritarian use of the types of credit rating 
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systems that are already common in wealthy democracies.189  Aside 
from substantial data collection, therefore, the applicability and 
comparability of the SCS to smart cities are relatively small. 
The evidence suggests that rather than finding SCSs to be a 
dystopian violation of personal privacy as they are invariably 
conceived of in Western media, they are extremely popular among 
average Chinese.  Evidence from a 2018 cross-regional online survey 
by Genia Kosta of the Freie Universität Berlin found remarkably 
high levels of support for social credit systems.  While 48.9% of 
respondents said they strongly approved of the schemes and 31.1% 
said they somewhat approved, less than 1.5% said they disapproved of 
such schemes.  Older, male, higher-income, more educated, and 
urban respondents showed higher levels of support.190  These findings 
may seem surprising, but supplementary “interviews show that 
citizens perceive SCSs not as an instrument of surveillance, but as an 
instrument to improve the quality of life and to close institutional and 
regulatory gaps, leading to more honest and law-abiding behavior in 
society.”191 
The difference between public perception of the SCS in China and 
its depiction in the Western media can largely be explained by the 
remarkably high levels of trust that Chinese people have in their 
state.  According to Edelman, the world’s biggest public relations firm 
by revenue, the Chinese have the highest level of trust in their 
government of the 26 countries they surveyed, with a score of 86 out 
of 100.192  Other empirical work has long shown high levels of trust 
and support for the Chinese state.193  This explanation is borne out by 
other findings of the survey; 77% of respondents expected the central 
government to be the most responsible user of personal data.  
Provincial (48%) and municipal governments (42%) were also seen as 
relatively trustworthy, and even state-owned companies (27%) were 
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viewed as far more trustworthy than private companies (8%).194  The 
conclusion, yet again, seems to be that, to date, average Chinese are 
comparatively comfortable with the collection, analysis, and use of 
data, especially when controlled by the state. 
D. Other Applications of Facial Recognition Technology 
While the other applications of smart city-related technology 
explored in this Section are large-scale projects, a few smaller 
examples of uses of facial recognition technology in China help us 
understand how far down the path to ubiquity important surveillance 
technology has traveled.  The examples also give color to how 
unconcerned the state and even private companies are with uses of 
technology that many citizens of democracies might see as Orwellian. 
China has slowly been rolling out new anti-jaywalking systems that 
use cameras, LED screens, and facial recognition to identify, fine, and 
shame jaywalkers.  At very busy intersections, cameras on traffic 
lights take pictures of jaywalkers, use facial-recognition software to 
identify them, and subsequently issue them fines as well as post their 
pictures and identifying details on screens mounted on the traffic 
lights.195  The technology amusingly misfired when it named a 
well-known Chinese businesswoman, Dong Mingzhu, as a jaywalker 
after recognizing her photograph from an advertisement on the side 
of a bus.196  Furthermore, in a pilot program at a public toilet in 
Beijing, facial recognition is used to combat toilet paper thieves by 
dispensing only two feet of toilet paper to any given person within 
nine minutes.197 
Chinese have little choice but to consent to systems like the 
anti-jaywalking traffic lights, though they could attempt to disguise 
their faces when they cross.  Yet, even when given a choice, the 
average Chinese seem relatively willing to “opt-in” to facial 
recognition even when the payoff seems vanishingly low.  In some 
Chinese airports, terminals offer the minor convenience of allowing 
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travelers to check their flight details by presenting their face to a 
camera equipped with facial recognition software.198  Some of KFC’s 
6000 outlets in China199 have even experimented with facial 
recognition systems for ordering food, and though the idea does not 
seem to have taken off, it also did not seem to spark any serious 
resistance.200  Facial recognition-based payment systems, however, 
are quickly gaining popularity.  In Henan’s capital of Zhengzhou, 
nearly 200,000 commuters opted to authorize facial recognition-based 
payments to use the local subway.201 
There does seem to be a limit, however, on the uses of facial 
recognition that average Chinese citizens, or at least netizens, will 
tolerate.  For example, in January 2020, 
the urban management department of Suzhou, a city of six million 
people in Anhui Province, sparked outrage online when it published 
surveillance photos taken by street cameras of seven residents 
wearing pajamas in public along with parts of their names, 
government identification numbers and the locations where their 
“uncivilized behavior” had taken place.202 
While the government’s battle against public pajamas and other 
“uncivilized behavior” has been an ongoing issue for over a decade in 
China, this use of facial recognition quickly attracted national 
criticism and caused Suzhou officials to apologize. 
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E. Lessons from the Chinese Case 
While the technologies and applications assessed in these cases are 
very different, each of them is essentially about the collection and use 
of data that, at least in theory, can be applied to smart cities.  It 
should be immediately evident that many of these examples fall afoul 
of Edwards’ key security issues.203  None of the systems explored 
above, with perhaps the minor exception of the airport facial 
recognition system, provide any meaningful opportunity for opting 
out or providing consent.  All these systems, but especially City Brain 
and the IJOP, create privately-held data linked specifically to 
individuals from “public” interactions that are as simple as walking 
down the street, making it very different than London’s CTV security 
footage.  All the systems seem to involve private contractors who may 
have access to the data, though admittedly a lack of information and 
transparency makes this issue difficult to assess fully.  Much of the 
data fed into these systems, especially City Brain, is repurposed from 
the Internet of Things.204  Finally, as was vividly demonstrated by 
Wethington, once collected data is stored on the cloud, little thought 
is given to its security. 
Beyond these clear failures to solve or even engage with privacy 
challenges, there are common themes that emerge from China’s 
projects, which help inform our comparison with wealthy 
democracies.  First, there is little concern on almost any level about 
what data is collected, how it is stored, for how long, and who has 
access to it.  Second, while wealthy democracies wring their hands 
about privacy and other issues,205 China and its private sector are 
powering ahead and at a staggering rate.  Third, there is little 
transparency about how any of these projects or technologies are 
advancing; this is unsurprising given that there seems to be relatively 
little demand for transparency from political or legal systems or even 
public opinion.  Fourth, the amount of data being collected and used 
in these projects is staggering.  With the vital exception of City Brain, 
however, there seems to be a lack of the big data analytical 
techniques and sophisticated algorithms of the kind we might expect 
and indeed has sometimes been (mis)reported.  It is possible that this 
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more sophisticated analysis is coming, perhaps as part of the 
expansion of City Brain.  But it is also possible that given the level of 
data available and the applicable goals, more sophisticated analysis is 
simply unnecessary.  Google, Facebook, and Amazon may need 
cutting edge data analytics to help fill in the blanks about user age, 
gender, religion, marital and family status, and other attributes.  Still, 
the Chinese State will already know any one of these data points as a 
certainty.  Lastly, average Chinese, with the notable exception of 
targeted minority groups, are generally willing to accept obviously 
authoritarian uses of the PRC’s rapidly increasing data collection.  
Chinese appear to overwhelmingly support a social credit system that 
is universally disparaged abroad.206  They are apparently willing to 
accept facial recognition even for the minor convenience of paying 
subway fare or getting their flight information.  This may seem 
surprising in the West, and yet it makes sense given the high level of 
trust most citizens have in the Chinese state.  Given, however, that 
this trust is largely built on the state’s record of overseeing the largest 
and most dramatic spurt of development in human history 
(performance legitimacy)207 and that trust in government usually 
suffers during a downturn (performance theory),208 it is likely that 
trust in the state would suffer from a serious economic downturn.  
While the details of how and when this might happen are unclear, the 
possibility concerns the Chinese state and may be one of the reasons 
for its ramping up of surveillance and other repressive capacities. 
Before indulging in dystopian speculation about the depth and 
power of China’s digital authoritarianism, it is important to have 
some reasonable perspective.  On a trip to Shanghai in May 2019, one 
of this Article’s authors could not help but notice that people paid 
little attention to face recognition-equipped traffic lights.  Instead, a 
much more obvious conflict was going on between Shanghai’s police 
and residents being ticketed for unregistered electric scooters or 
riding bicycles on the sidewalk.  These conflicts could be seen played 
out all over Shanghai, but always in person and often with long, 
drawn-out arguments between the public security officers and people 
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being fined.209  What is more, the e-scooter crackdown seems to 
extend only to a handful of China’s largest cities.210  Within smaller, 
less-developed cities, these types of violations still generally go almost 
completely unnoticed.  The PRC’s dreams of complete surveillance 
and control are vast,211 and the progress is rapid, but in many areas, 
state capacity and the monitoring and control of society still lags what 
is common in wealthy democracies.212  In the contemporary PRC, 
policing society still happens face to face. 
III. DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES TO THE CHINA MODEL 
In this Article, we argue that China’s rapid advancement in smart 
cities technology should be a wakeup call to democracies.  But the 
fact that it has forged ahead so quickly also means that the China 
Model offers vivid examples that other democracies can learn from — 
although in most cases, China provides an example that democracies 
should avoid, rather than follow.  This Part contrasts the Chinese 
example with the development of smart city technology in wealthy 
democracies.  In particular, we examine the potential role of 
surveillance intermediaries and consider the role of Europe’s data 
privacy law and potential U.S. parallels.  Further, we evaluate if and 
how wealthy democracies can compete with Chinese smart city 
technology.  Finally, we consider what China’s rapid advancement in 
smart cities and democracies’ lagging response means in the rest of 
the world. 
China’s smart city technologies offer almost no transparency or 
consent in terms of the collection, use, or storage of data.  
Additionally, when asked, private companies will not resist the 
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state.213  Samantha Hoffman, a visiting academic fellow at the 
Mercator Institute for China Studies, explained that “Under [China’s] 
Cyber Security Law, the personal data a company collects can be 
protected from misuse by the company . . . that same data, however, is 
not protected from the government.  This isn’t contradictory in 
Chinese law, even if it is according to Western norms.”214  In short, 
China can serve as a vivid demonstration of a system in which the 
state and private companies fail to check one another in the collection 
and use of data. 
Another serious issue in China is the lack of choice between 
companies that may collect personal information.  In no small part, 
this is due to a close collaboration between the private sector and the 
state.  Private companies like Huawei and Alibaba maintain and 
value close relationships with the state; other technology companies, 
including all cellular network providers, are state-owned.  
Additionally, foreign competitors that might offer a more 
privacy-friendly alternative are censored or banned from certain 
sectors.215 
Democracies advancing smart cities technology should ensure they 
give their citizens more choice.  Many applications of smart cities 
technology make use of public data in some way.  That said, it is 
difficult for even a relatively educated and wealthy consumer who 
cares a great deal about data privacy to move away from a jurisdiction 
with weak privacy protections to one that takes data security more 
seriously.  By contrast, shifting between providers of other types of 
products involved in collecting and using smart cities data could be 
much easier.  In many cases, consumers can shift between ride-hailing 
apps, smartphone makers, internet providers, and other service 
providers in a few minutes and at no cost.  One lesson for smart city 
designers, therefore, could be to ensure that consumers and residents 
are provided as much choice as possible when using private or 
third-party products to interact with smart city infrastructure. 
A. Surveillance Intermediaries  
Because of the high technological bar and investment needed for 
large scale smart cities projects, it is probable that nearly all will 
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involve private partners.  As we have seen in the Chinese case, this 
can create potential problems and an added layer of complexity when 
trying to protect privacy.  Yet, we argue it could also create 
opportunities for helping to protect data and privacy better and limit 
the abuse of smart cities technology. 
Tech companies in wealthy democracies could play a vital role in 
protecting personal data from the state.  In part, this could and should 
be a result of legal restrictions that prevent companies from 
collecting, keeping, or sharing certain kinds of data.  But market 
incentives can also induce companies to take privacy more seriously.  
Companies can create significant value for their brands by cultivating 
a reputation for keeping its customers’ data secure.  While most 
consumers are probably more worried about malicious actors, 
evidence that a company can and will protect data from the state can 
be important to many, from small-government conservatives in the 
United States to citizens of developing countries with worrisome 
records on civil liberties.  Imagine if customers in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, or Iran had a choice between Chinese 
technology they could be relatively sure would allow the state access 
to their data, and a company based in a democracy with strict data 
privacy protection, which consumers could be relatively sure would 
do its best to pushback against state snooping.  This possibility is not 
theoretical: in repeatedly and very publicly refusing to unlock iPhones 
for the American federal government, Apple has proven both the 
strength of its encryption and the depth of its commitment to privacy 
protection.  The volume, and more importantly, the nature of the 
publicity that this incident generated for Apple could not be bought 
at any price.216 
Current U.S. law and the policies of big tech firms seriously limit 
the extent to which technology firms can push back against 
government requests for data.  The third-party doctrine, as applied in 
United States v. Miller217 and Smith v. Maryland,218 holds that 
voluntarily providing information to a third party forfeits any privacy 
interest in that information.219  The inability of private companies to 
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push back against U.S. law enforcement is evidenced by the 
remarkable quantity of data major technology companies provide to 
the government.  By 2019, “Facebook said it produced data for 88% 
of U.S. government requests, and that a majority of them, 47,457, 
were under the ‘legal process’ category that includes search warrants, 
subpoenas and court orders.”220  These requests extend to a large 
number of technology companies and have been rising 
dramatically.221 
Existing jurisprudence also helps point towards possible legal 
solutions to how to protect personal data better.  For example, United 
States v. Jones raised the possibility of a constitutional difference 
between short- and long-term surveillance.222  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Samuel Alito wrote:  
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy 
that our society has recognized as reasonable.  But the use of longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.223 
Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurring opinion picked up on 
similar themes.224  Years later, the implications of IoT enabled 
surveillance and just how far long term and even retroactive 
surveillance could be taken were addressed in Carpenter v. United 
States.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts opined: 
With access to CSLI [cell site location information], the 
Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s 
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices [sic] of the 
wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five 
years.  Critically, because location information is continually logged 
for all of the 400 million devices in the United States — not just 
those belonging to persons who might happen to come under 
investigation — this newfound tracking capacity runs against 
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everyone.  Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not 
even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular 
individual, or when.  Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has 
effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and 
the police may — in the Government’s view — call upon the results 
of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Only the few without cell phones could escape this 
tireless and absolute surveillance.225 
Companies can and should create more streamlined systems that 
collect less data, anonymize it, or delete it more quickly.  Currently, 
American mobile providers store customers’ location data collected 
for between one year (Verizon) and seven years (AT&T).226  There 
seems little justification for keeping this data, especially 
un-anonymized, other than selling it to third parties, which has come 
under congressional and popular scrutiny.227  Strong legal restrictions 
on both selling data and keeping it for extended periods would help 
companies resist state demands for data.  Companies cannot be made 
to produce data they never collected, no longer have, or cannot link 
to specific individuals. 
Building on the logic established in Jones and Carpenter, the 
United States could structure its data privacy around a short- versus 
long-term distinction.  Personal data could be used to optimize traffic, 
emergency response routes, public transit, and a wide variety of other 
city services, but could be legally required to be deleted within hours 
or even minutes. 
If the United States is to become an exemplar of data privacy to be 
emulated and to disperse high standards along with its smart cities 
technology globally, it will need newer, smarter, and tougher laws.  In 
this regard, the European Union is already far ahead of the United 
States.  In the next Section, we examine a case that shows how 
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) can and has 
empowered surveillance intermediaries to push back against the local 
state. We will also show how California’s new privacy law is bringing 
the United States into line with these same standards. 
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B. Europe 
Thanks to the GDPR, the European Union, composed of nearly 30 
sovereign nations, can be seen as having a more comprehensive, 
coherent, and consistent privacy policy than the United States.228  
There are several reasons for this.  In part, it is the result of the strong 
federal nature of the United States, which has also hurt advancements 
in other areas of innovation that generally benefit from strong 
government support.  For example, policy fragmentation and lack of 
clear national leadership were two of the reasons that the United 
States was surpassed by the PRC and the European Union in the 
development of renewable energy, where a “patchwork of state-level 
approaches creates complexity, instills uncertainty, and inhibits 
opportunities to optimize resource allocation.”229 
Yet the U.S. federal structure also offers opportunities for specific 
jurisdictions, especially populous ones, to lead the way by setting 
higher standards than the federal government or other states.  
Sometimes this is merely states fulfilling their roles as “laboratories of 
democracy.”230  When a state or city sets a higher minimum wage, it 
provides an example that other states or the federal government may 
or may not choose to emulate.231  But when a particularly populous 
state sets strict standards that certain products must meet, companies 
often choose to meet this higher standard with products offered 
throughout the United States or even the world.  For example, 
California’s emissions and fuel standards for automobiles are 
“benchmarks set in the Golden State [that] ripple through the rest of 
the country and can even shape the global market.”232  For this 
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reason, the best hope for near-term improvements in privacy 
regulations in the United States comes in the form of the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the strictest privacy law in the 
United States, which came into effect in January 2020.233  The CCPA 
will have a nation-wide, and to a lesser extent, global impact not only 
because of California’s large population and lucrative markets but 
because over half of the United States’ and over a quarter of the 
world’s 20 largest tech companies are headquartered in California.234 
The CCPA will set the de facto national standard for privacy for 
the foreseeable future.  It will, therefore, begin to bring the United 
States into line with the privacy principles enshrined in Europe’s 
GDPR.  More specifically, those principals are lawfulness, fairness, 
and transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; 
storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality (security); and 
accountability.235  Taken together as the standard for Europe and the 
de facto standard for the United States, the GDPR and CCPA could 
give companies in wealthy democracies a relatively clear global 
standard.  When combined, the United States and the European 
Union represent a market of around 800 million people and a GDP 
that is still far larger than the PRC’s.  This could give companies 
developing smart cities technologies in wealthy democracies a market 
big enough for them to compete with Chinese companies.  
Additionally, Chinese companies will need to meet these same 
standards, at least in the United States and European Union, lest they 
forgo many of the world’s largest markets.  In order to capitalize on 
these opportunities, efforts should be taken to harmonize the privacy 
regimes among democracies as much as possible. 
While the impact of the CCPA is still uncertain, the GDPR, which 
has applied since May 25, 2018, has already had a substantial 
impact.236  The idea that private service providers might push back 
against government overreach with smart cities data might initially 
seem optimistic, yet this is exactly what the GDPR has helped some 
surveillance intermediaries to do.  Brøndby IF, a football club based 
in the outskirts of Copenhagen, uses facial recognition software to 
prevent known troublemakers from attending matches in the team’s 
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stadium.237  Brøndby’s system marks one of the first private 
large-scale uses of facial recognition software after the GDPR came 
into effect.238  In compliance with the GDPR, the facial recognition 
system is used to enter those from the watchlist into the system only 
on game day and is deleted at the end of the day.  The system is kept 
separate from the internet, and a cross-check is used to avoid false 
positives.239 
The value of strict data privacy laws being passed and enforced on 
private systems and the contrast with the Chinese case examined 
above should be clear.  Less clear is the extent to which such laws 
could and should enable private companies to push back against 
possible overreach from other parts of the state.  Mickel Lauritsen, 
Brøndby’s security chief, says that local police have asked him to use 
the team’s facial recognition system to assist in an investigation, but 
that he was obligated to refuse by the terms of their regulatory 
permission.240  There are signs that these clear rules, when strictly 
enforced, facilitate public trust. In the words of one football fan, 
“You can’t do anything in Denmark without getting the proper 
approval.  So it’s not being misused, I don’t think.  You can’t do that 
in Denmark.”241 
An arrangement like the strict European approach to privacy, 
however, may be difficult or impossible to replicate in the United 
States.  For one thing, it is relatively easy for Europe to be strict or 
even punitive against technology companies in both legislation and 
enforcement because none of the world’s largest tech companies are 
based in Europe.  Yet the CCPA should provide some hope here as 
well: if California can move to reign in its large tech firms like Apple, 
Alphabet, and Facebook, perhaps the rest of the country will be 
willing to follow.  Nevertheless, even if the legislation and tough 
enforcement prove forthcoming, it is not clear that public opinion will 
follow.  China and most governments in Europe, especially Northern 
Europe, have long enjoyed higher levels of trust among their 
people.242  This is unlikely to be easy or fast to reproduce in the U.S. 
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context and is another reason that more market-based solutions to 
data privacy issues might be a more practical choice in the United 
States. 
C. Can Democracies Compete with the PRC’s Smart City 
Technology? 
In this Article, we argue that wealthy democracies must push 
forward with the development of smart cities for two reasons.  First, 
smart cities can provide meaningful benefits not only to the residents 
of wealthy democracies, such as in improving traffic but also to the 
world, like combatting climate change.  Second, if wealthy 
democracies and their corporations do not offer the world smart cities 
technologies that allow for some measure of privacy, democracy, and 
personal freedom, then non-democratic countries and their 
corporations will offer them smart cities technologies that do less to 
address these concerns. 
The idea that China could beat out wealthy democracies in smart 
cities technology has a strong precedent.  The most relevant example 
is the current state of and debates about 5G technology and its 
deployment around the globe.243  Beginning wide-scale deployment in 
2019, 5G is a fifth-generation wireless technology that offers much 
faster data on digital cellular networks.  Huawei, a Chinese company 
with close links to the Chinese state, is the world leader in 5G 
technology.  The United States has repeatedly voiced security 
concerns about Huawei’s close relationship to the Chinese state and 
that using their technology could give Beijing unprecedented access 
to, and even control over, other countries’ communication 
technology.  In the words of a report published by the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: 
Chinese companies are not only subsidised by the Chinese 
government but also legally compelled to work with its intelligence 
services.  Whether the risk of such collaboration is real or perceived, 
the fear remains that adopting 5G technology from Huawei would 
introduce a reliance on equipment which can be controlled by the 
Chinese intelligence services and the military in both peacetime and 
crisis.244 
There are alternatives to Huawei’s technology available from 
companies, such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung, that are based in 
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liberal democracies.245  Yet, Huawei advertises its technology as not 
only cheaper to purchase, but lighter, easier, faster, and cheaper to 
install, cheaper to maintain, and more energy-efficient.246  Because of 
these advantages and despite the warnings from the United States 
and NATO, some of the wealthiest nations in the world, including 
Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, are opting for Huawei’s technology.247  
The calculus for poorer developing nations is likely to be even simpler 
and inevitable.248  A massive and rapid change will need to occur if 
Huawei is not to dominate the world’s cellular networks in the near 
future. 
In no small part, Huawei’s success in 5G technology is the result of 
strong support from the Chinese state. 
A Wall Street Journal review of Huawei’s grants, credit facilities, tax 
breaks and other forms of financial assistance details for the first 
time how Huawei had access to as much as $75 billion in state 
support as it grew from a little-known vendor of phone switches to 
the world’s largest telecom-equipment company — helping Huawei 
offer generous financing terms and undercut rivals’ prices by some 
30%, analysts and customers say.249 
As security concerns related to the rollout of Huawei-powered 5G 
networks grow, the United States is finally reacting.  In January 2020, 
a bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced legislation that would 
provide over $1 billion for the development of 5G alternatives to 
Huawei.250  Yet, with funding a fraction the size of what Huawei 
received, and 5G technology already being implemented, the 
initiative seems like far too little, far too late.  Just as 5G technology 
gives insight into potential Chinese dominance of smart cities, it 
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echoes China’s success in previous races for technology, especially 
renewable energy.251 
What makes these examples truly worrying from the perspective of 
smart cities is that China beat wealthy democracies in the 
development of technologies such as 5G and solar panels, even 
though these technologies are not subject to nearly the same level of 
concern, complexity, and negative public onion as many smart cities 
technologies. 
D. Battlegrounds for the Meaning of Smart Cities? 
City Brain is already being implemented in Malaysia’s most 
populous metropolis.252  This points to Southeast Asia as the probable 
location of the first battleground in the contest of smart city 
technology between the PRC and democracies.  Geographically, the 
countries of Southeast Asia are relatively close to China.  Most have 
large ethnic Chinese communities that have traditionally worked in 
business and may maintain business ties to China.253  Southeast Asian 
countries also have relatively similar levels of development to 
China,254  and relatively positive attitudes towards the PRC, at least 
compared to other Asian countries like India, Japan, and South 
Korea.255  They also have generally more authoritarian and less 
democratic tendencies.256  These last two factors could be important 
for minimizing public opinion pushback against projects that could 
give not only their countries’ leaders but Chinese companies and even 
the Chinese state, the key to ubiquitous surveillance of their cities. 
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Southeast Asia is not unique, however, in their increasingly 
overflowing and traffic-clogged cities, which are badly in need of 
improved infrastructure and services.257  Even if Chinese tech 
companies do not find Southeast Asia to be fertile ground for their 
smart cities technology, as Alibaba seems to hope, other regions like 
the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and even Latin America all offer likely opportunities because they 
suffer from many of the same problems arising from rapid 
urbanization.258 
None of this is to suggest, however, that people, companies, or 
governments in developing countries outside China lack agency.  A 
country like India with a huge population and an already impressive 
technology sector could still emerge as to equal or even outmatch the 
smart city technology developed in China and wealthy democracies. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD  
While we recognize that smart city efforts like Quayside face 
serious and unanswered questions about data and digital 
infrastructure, we argue three major reasons why democracies must 
continue to develop smart cities technology with all deliberate speed.  
First, many of the questions about data privacy and digital 
infrastructure can only be answered through real working examples of 
smart cities technology.  Some projects may fail to produce results.  
Others may end up being viewed as not responsive enough to terms 
and concerns related to data protection.  Yet, if there is any lesson to 
be drawn from the experiences of the digital revolution, it is that both 
experiences of failure and the creation of successful models are 
necessary for smart cities to continue to advance.  Smart cities 
developers may have to “move fast and break things” (Facebook’s 
motto until 2014),259 especially if they are to catch up with their 
Chinese competitors. 
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Second, smart cities projects have the potential to be important 
parts of the solution to pressing global issues such as climate change 
and inequality.  Many of the technologies with the most potential to 
address these problems are the least objectionable.  Smart cities 
should not be only about the shiniest technology and fastest 
processors.  Instead, they should take data seriously and focus on 
those technologies that offer the most advantage the most efficiently 
— even if that is something as simple as wood construction. 
Third, if democracies do not develop and regulate their own smart 
cities technology, the spread of PRC-based technology will go largely 
unchallenged.  Democracies should not let the great be the enemy of 
the good.  Some compromises and sacrifices of data privacy may be 
necessary to strike a balance and move smart cities technologies 
forward before China gains an advantage in smart cities that is 
insurmountable.  Temporary concessions to Google over a project 
like Quayside could be rolled back relatively easily by democratic 
governments. Cities-worth of cameras feeding into Alibaba’s servers 
will, conversely, be far harder to undo. 
Finally, we offer two major recommendations that we believe could 
help in the development of smart cities in the democratic world.  
First, massive government investment in smart cities to help counter 
the tremendous sums that the PRC has already poured into their 
smart cities’ efforts.  This must be done before it is too late, as 
demonstrated by the example of 5G or solar technology.  Second, 
clear and transparent laws protecting users and residents must be 
implemented and enforced.  Violations need to be announced and 
punished transparently and publicly.  These laws also need to 
empower private companies to refuse government requests for data.  
The laws should be harmonized within countries and even across as 
many democracies as possible.  Only this will provide a more or less 
unified market that is bigger than China’s market. 
In reality, it may be too late for some technologies and projects to 
catch up with City Brain in the near term.  Every wasted opportunity, 
however, moves farther away from the prospect of cities that are not 
only smart but also transparent and respectful of individuals’ data. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article generally assumes that smart cities technology is 
coming, whether academics, governments, lawyers, judges, or citizens 
like it or not.  Even if companies in wealthy democracies do not 
develop or implement certain types of technology for legal, political, 
commercial, or ethical reasons, companies in other countries, like the 
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PRC, will happily sell and implement their smart city technologies.  
Indeed, Section II.A discussed how this is already happening. 
This Article considers how contrasting approaches to smart cities 
has and will impact smart city development, and how the technologies 
will be adopted outside of the PRC and wealthy democracies.  It is 
imperative for established democracies, and the companies based in 
them, to continue to move forward with smart cities technology 
development and implementation.  Further, they should use smart 
city technology with the most rigorous standards of transparency and 
oversight possible.  Because smart city technology will continue to 
spread, particularly to the developing world where the will and ability 
to guard against its abuse is lower, wealthy democracies must push 
forward with the development of smart cities, both to create 
technology with better built-in safeguards and to develop and 
normalize rolling best practices for data privacy. 
